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1 Introduction
In this paper, we construct an equilibrium model of directed search in a
large labor market in which unemployed workers make multiple job applica-
tions. What we mean by equilibrium directed search is a matching process
in which job seekers, observing the wages posted at all vacancies, send their
applications to the vacancies that they nd most attractive. At the same
time, each vacancy, when it chooses its wage posting, takes into account that
its posted wage inuences the number of applicants it can expect to attract.
We assume that each unemployed worker makes a xed number of appli-
cations, a: Each vacancy (among those receiving applications) then chooses
one applicant to whom it o¤ers its job. When a > 1, there is a possibility
that more than one vacancy will want to hire the same worker. In this case,
we assume that the vacancies in question compete for this workers services.
The introduction of multiple applications adds realism to the directed search
model, and, in addition, can a¤ect the e¢ ciency properties of equilibrium.
We thank three anonymous referees and our editor, Fabrizio Zilibotti for detailed and
helpful comments. We also thank Ken Burdett, Benoit Julien, Vladimir Karamychev, Ian
King, Harald Lang, Dale Mortensen, Lucas Navarro, and Rob Shimer.
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In the benchmark competitive search equilibrium model of directed search
(Moen 1997 or the extended version in Mortensen and Wright 2002), equi-
librium is constrained Pareto e¢ cient. We show that changing the basic
directed search model to allow workers to make more than one application
results in equilibria that are not constrained e¢ cient. This means there is
a role for labor market policy in the directed search framework.
When a = 1; our model is essentially the limiting version of Burdett, Shi,
and Wright (2001) (hereafter BSW) translated to a labor market setting.
BSW derive a unique symmetric equilibrium in which (in the labor market
version) all vacancies post a wage between zero (the monopsony wage) and
one (the competitive wage). The value of this common posted wage depends
on the number of unemployed, u; and the number of vacancies, v; in the
market. Letting u; v !1 with v=u = ; the equilibrium posted wage is an
increasing function of : BSW do not consider normative questions. Moens
result is that in a large labor market, directed search implements what
he calls competitive search equilibrium. Competitive search equilibrium
is constrained e¢ cient in the following sense. Assume there is a cost per
vacancy created. A social planner would choose a level of vacancy creation
or, in a large labor market, a level of labor market tightness, ; to trade
o¤ the cost of vacancy creation against the benet of making it easier for
workers to match in an optimal fashion. Moen shows that the  the social
planner would choose is the same as the one that arises in competitive search
equilibrium. (Shimer 1995 independently derives a similar result.) Using
a di¤erent approach, we also show that equilibrium in a directed search
model is constrained e¢ cient in a large labor market when a = 1: More
importantly, however, we show that if each worker makes a nite number of
multiple applications, that is, if a 2 f2; :::; Ag; then equilibrium in a directed
search model is not constrained e¢ cient. Specically, too many vacancies
are posted ( is too high) in free-entry equilibrium relative to the constrained
e¢ cient level. Equivalently, vacancies pay the workers who take their jobs
too low a wage on average.
Our model is also related to Julien, Kennes, and King (2000) (hereafter
JKK). JKK assume that each unemployed worker posts a minimum wage
at which he or she is willing to work, i.e., a reserve wage,and that each
vacancy, observing all posted reserve wages, then makes an o¤er to one
worker. If more than one vacancy wants to hire the same worker, then, as
in our model, there is ex post competition for that workers services. This
is equivalent to a model in which each worker applies to every vacancy, i.e.,
a = v; sending the same reserve wage in each application. Each vacancy
then chooses one worker at random to whom it o¤ers a job. If a worker
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has more than one o¤er, then there is competition for his or her services.
In a nite labor market, JKK show that the unique, symmetric equilibrium
reserve wage lies between the monopsony and competitive levels. There is
thus equilibrium wage dispersion in their model. Those workers who receive
only one o¤er are employed at the reserve wage, while those who receive
multiple o¤ers are employed at the competitive wage. In the limiting labor
market version of JKK, the symmetric equilibrium reserve wage converges
to zero, and free-entry equilibrium is again constrained e¢ cient.
In our model, when a 2 f2; :::; Ag, all vacancies post the monopsony wage
in the unique symmetric equilibrium. As in JKK, this leads to equilibrium
wage dispersion. Some workers (those who receive exactly one o¤er) are
employed at the monopsony wage, and some workers (those who receive
multiple o¤ers) have their wages bid up to the competitive level. The key
di¤erence between our model and both BSW and JKK, however, is that
free-entry equilibrium is ine¢ cient. When a 2 f2; :::; Ag; there is excessive
vacancy creation.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we
derive our basic positive results in a single-period framework. Specically,
treating  as given, we derive the matching function and the symmetric
equilibrium posted wage. In Section 3, we endogenize  by allowing for free
entry of vacancies. This lets us compare the free-entry equilibrium level of 
to the constrained e¢ cient level (the two values of  are the same when a = 1;
di¤erent when a 2 f2; :::; Ag; and the same once again as a!1). In Section
4, we present a steady-state version of our model for the case of a 2 f2; ::; Ag:
The key to the steady-state analysis is that a worker who receives only one
o¤er in the current period has the option to reject that o¤er in favor of
waiting for a future period in which more than one vacancy bids for his or
her services. Allowing for free entry of vacancies, this leads to a tractable
model in which labor market tightness and the equilibrium wage distribution
are determined simultaneously. The normative results that we derived in
the single-period model continue to hold in the steady-state setting. In
Section 5, we consider three extensions. Specically, (i) we allow workers to
choose how many applications to make, (ii) we relax the assumption that
each vacancy can consider only one workers application, and (iii) we allow
vacancies to follow strategies that rule out Bertrand competition. These
extensions, while of interest in their own right, also serve as robustness
checks  our basic result that the free-entry equilibrium value of  is too
high when a 2 f2; :::; Ag continues to hold. Finally, we conclude in Section
6.
3
2 The Basic Model
We consider a game played by u homogeneous unemployed workers and (the
owners of) v homogeneous vacancies. This game has several stages:
1. Each vacancy posts a wage.
2. Each unemployed worker observes all posted wages and then submits
a applications with no more than one application going to any one
vacancy.
3. Each vacancy that receives at least 1 application randomly selects one
to process. Any excess applications are returned as rejections.
4. A vacancy with a processed application o¤ers the applicant the posted
wage. If more than one vacancy makes an o¤er to a particular worker,
then those vacancies bid against one another for that workers services.
5. A worker with one o¤er can accept or reject that o¤er. A worker with
more than one o¤er can accept one of the o¤ers or reject all of them.
Workers who fail to match with a vacancy and vacancies that fail to match
with a worker receive payo¤s of zero. The payo¤ for a worker who matches
with a vacancy is w; where w is the wage that he or she is paid. A vacancy
that hires a worker at a wage of w receives a payo¤ of 1  w:
This is a model of directed search in the sense that workers observe
all wage postings and direct their applications to vacancies with attractive
wages and/or where relatively little competition is expected. We assume
that vacancies cannot pay less than their posted wages. If they could, this
would not be a model of directed search.
Before we analyze this game, some comments on the underlying assump-
tions are in order. First, we are treating a as a parameter of the search
technology; that is, the number of applications is taken as given. In general,
a 2 f1; 2; :::; Ag: Second, we assume that it takes a period for a vacancy to
process an application. This is why vacancies return excess applications as
rejections. This processing-time assumption captures the idea that when
workers apply for several jobs at the same time, rms can waste time and
e¤ort pursuing applicants who ultimately go elsewhere. Finally, we assume
that two or more vacancies that select the same applicant engage in ex post
Bertrand competition for that worker. This means that workers who receive
more than one o¤er have their wages bid up to w = 1; the competitive
wage. In Section 5, we consider the implications of relaxing each of these
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assumptions. We show that endogenizing a; allowing vacancies to process
more than one application, and allowing vacancies that are competing for
an applicant to pursue a di¤erent tie-breaking strategy do not reverse our
main results.
We consider symmetric equilibria in which all vacancies post the same
wage and all workers use the same strategy to direct their applications. We
do this in a large labor market in which we let u; v ! 1 with v=u = 
keeping a 2 f1; 2; :::; Ag xed. We show that for each (; a) combination
there is a unique symmetric equilibrium and we derive the corresponding
equilibrium matching probability and posted wage. Assuming (for the mo-
ment) the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, we begin with the matching
probability.
LetM(u; v; a) be the expected number of matches in a labor market with
u unemployed workers and v vacancies when each unemployed worker sub-
mits a applications. Then m(; a) = lim
u;v!1;v=u=
M(u; v; a)
u
is the matching
probability for an unemployed worker in a large labor market.
Proposition 1 Let u; v ! 1 with v=u =  and a 2 f1; :::; Ag xed. The
probability that a worker nds a job converges to
m(; a) = 1  (1  
a
(1  e a=))a: (1)
The proof is given in Albrecht et. al. (2004); see also Philip (2003).
In Appendix A, we sketch the idea of the proof to clarify the relationship
between our matching probability and the nite-market matching functions
presented in BSW (the standard urn-ball matching function) and JKK (the
urn-ball matching function with the roles of u and v reversed).
For use below, we note the following properties of m(; a):
(i) m(; a) is increasing and concave in ;
lim
!0
m(; a) = 0; and lim
!1
m(; a) = 1;
(ii)
m(; a)

is decreasing in ; 1
lim
!0
m(; a)

= 1; and lim
!1
m(; a)

= 0:
1 Interestingly,
m(; a)

is not convex in ; as can be seen immediately by considering
the case of a = 1: The properties of m(; a) and
m(; a)

given in (i) and (ii) are the
minimal ones required for our normative results in Sections 3 and 4 below.
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The e¤ect of a on m(; a) is less clearcut. Treating a as a continu-
ous variable, we nd that ma(; a) ? 0 as
a
1  q
@q
@a
  ln(1   q) ? 0 where
q =

a
(1  e a=): For moderately large values of  ( > 12 ; approximately),
m(; a) rst increases and then decreases with a: This nonmonotonicity re-
ects the double coordination problem that arises when workers apply to
more than one but not all vacancies. The rst coordination problem is the
standard one associated with urn-ball matching, namely, that some vacan-
cies can receive applications from more than one worker, while others receive
none. With multiple applications, there is a second coordination problem,
this time among vacancies. When workers apply for more than one job at
a time, some workers can receive o¤ers from more than one vacancy, while
others receive none. Ultimately, a worker can only take one job, and the
vacancies that lose the race for a worker will have wasted time and ef-
fort while considering his or her application. The matching function derived
in BSW captures only the urn-ball friction, while the one derived in JKK
captures only the multiple-application friction. Our matching probability
incorporates both these frictions, and the interaction between these two
frictions provides new insights.
Proposition 1 and its implications are only interesting if a symmetric
equilibrium exists. We now turn to the existence question.
Proposition 2 Consider a large labor market in which u; v ! 1 with
v=u = : There is a unique symmetric equilibrium to the wage-posting game.
When a = 1; all vacancies post a wage of
w(; 1) =
e 1=
(1  e 1=) : (2)
When a 2 f2; :::; Ag; w(; a) = 0; and the fraction of wages paid that are
equal to one is
(; a) =
1  (1  a(1  e a=))a   (1  e a=)(1  a(1  e a=))a 1
1  (1  a(1  e a=))a
:
(3)
The proof is given in Appendix B. The basic idea is as follows. To
prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, we show that w(; 1) has
the property that if all vacancies, with the possible exception of a potential
deviant, post that wage, then it is also in the interest of the deviant to
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post that wage. When a 2 f2; :::; Ag; then no matter what the common
wage posted by other vacancies, it is always in the interest of the deviant to
undercut that common wage. This forces the wage down to the monopsony
level, which in our single-period model is w = 0:
The equilibrium wage for the case of a = 1 is equal to one minus the
price given in Proposition 3 in BSW again with the appropriate notational
change. The tradeo¤ that leads to a well-behaved equilibrium wage, w 2
(0; 1); when a = 1 is the standard one in equilibrium search theory. To see
this, note that the prot for a deviant (D) from o¤ering w0 rather than the
common posted wage, w; can be written as:
(w0;w) = (1 w0)P [D gets at least one application]P [selected applicant has no other o¤er];
where the third term vanishes in the a = 1 case. As any particular vacancy
increases its posted wage, holding the wages posted at other vacancies con-
stant, the prot that this vacancy generates conditional on attracting an
applicant, (1   w0), decreases. At the same time, however, the probability
that it will attract at least one applicant also increases. This tradeo¤ varies
smoothly with ; so the equilibrium wage varies smoothly between zero and
one. Thus, as emphasized in BSW (p. 1069), there is a sense in which
frictions smooththe operation of the labor market.
When a 2 f2; :::; Ag; no matter what the value of , the posted wage
collapses to the monopsony level (as in Diamond (1971)). The intuition for
this result is based on the change in the tradeo¤underlying equilibrium wage
determination. The prot for the deviant vacancy conditional on hiring a
worker, (1   w0); decreases as in the a = 1 case. The probability that D
attracts at least one applicant also increases, but not as much as in the
a = 1 case. This is the key to the result, since the third term is una¤ected
by changes in w0. The reason that this probability increases less when a = 2
or more is that w0 > w is relatively less attractive to workers than when
a = 1. In the a = 1 case, receiving w0 means doing better than at any other
vacancy. When a = 2 or more, the worker has the possibility of multiple
o¤ers and receiving the competitive wage. When w0 > w; the probability of
multiple o¤ers is lower when applying to D than to the nondeviants since
D is relatively more attractive. This e¤ect is absent in the a = 1 case so
applying to the deviant is less attractive when a = 2 or more. This explains
why the equilibrium wage is lower than when a = 1: Essentially, the cost of
increasing the posted wage is the same as in the case of a = 1; the expected
benet is lower. The reason the equilibrium wage is driven to the monopsony
level is that posting a wage w0 < w is always attractive. First, as in the
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a = 1 case, it raises the prot earned if the applicant is hired at w0: Second,
it decreases the probability of attracting at least one applicant, but at a
decreasing rate. This is the consequence of the benet of multiple o¤ers
to workers. Applying to the deviant and being o¤ered this job implies a
lower wage if this is the only o¤er and the competitive wage if the worker
receives multiple o¤ers. Since the probability of receiving multiple o¤ers is
higher when applying to D (since its wage is otherwise less attractive), the
probability of getting the competitive wage is greater. As the common wage
falls, the cost of applying to the deviant remains the same, but this latter
benet rises. Thus, the decrease in the probability of the deviant getting at
least one application is reduced as the common wage falls and it is always
protable to undercut the common wage.
Interestingly, when a 2 f2; :::; Ag; the equilibrium outcome in our di-
rected search model is the same as the outcome one would nd in a random
search model in which workers make multiple applications and vacancies
engage in Bertrand competition when their candidates have multiple o¤ers.
If workers do not observe posted wages, they apply at random to a va-
cancies in symmetric equilibrium, and the matching rate is the same as in
our model. In addition, vacancies pay the monopsony wage in this random
search model, unless a worker has multiple o¤ers, in which case Bertrand
competition drives the wage to the competitive level. Thus, allowing for
multiple applications erases the di¤erence between directed and random
search in terms of outcomes in contrast to the case of a = 1. To the best
of our knowledge, no random search model with multiple applications and
Bertrand competition exists in the literature, but it would be straightfor-
ward to construct such a model. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) is the most
closely related model. In their model, wage o¤ers arrive at Poisson rates to
both the unemployed and the employed. If a worker who is already employed
receives another o¤er, then that workers current employer and prospective
new employer engage in Bertrand competition for his or her services. In the
homogeneous worker/homogeneous rm version of their model, this leads to
a two-point distribution of wages paid, namely, the monopsony wage and
the competitive wage, as in our model.
Finally, despite the fact that the posted equilibrium wage in our model
is zero when a 2 f2; :::; Ag, there is still a sense in which the wagevaries
smoothly with : The expected fraction of wages paid that are equal to one,
(; a); has the following properties:
(i) (; a) is increasing in  and in a;
(ii) lim
!0
(; a) = 0 and lim
!1
(; a) = 1:
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The fact that  is increasing in  is exactly as one would expect as the
labor market gets tighter, the chance that an individual worker gets multiple
o¤ers increases. To understand why  is also increasing in a; it is important
to remember that (; a) is the expected wage for those workers who match
with a vacancy; in particular, those workers who fail to match are not treated
as receiving a wage of zero. Finally, dening () = lim
a!1(; a); we can show
() =
1  e    e 
1  e  : (4)
This is the expected wage in a large labor market when each worker sends
out an arbitrarily large number of applications.
3 E¢ ciency
We now turn to the question of constrained e¢ ciency. The result suggested
by the e¢ ciency of competitive search equilibrium holds in our setting when
a = 1; however, when workers make a xed number of multiple applications,
this result breaks down.
Suppose vacancies are set up at the beginning of the period and that each
vacancy is created at cost cv: The e¢ cient level of labor market tightness2
is determined as the solution to
max
>0
m(; a)  cv:
The rst-order condition for this maximization is
cv = m(
; a): (5)
The equilibrium level of labor market tightness is determined by free entry.
When a = 1; this means
cv =
m(; 1)

(1  w(; 1)); (6)
whereas for a 2 f2; :::; Ag; the condition is
cv =
m(; a)

(1  (; a)): (7)
2 In a nite labor market with u given, the social planner chooses v to maximize
M(u; v; a)   cv; i.e., expected output (equal to the expected number of matches since
each match produces an output of 1) minus the vacancy creation costs. Dividing the
maximand by u and letting u; v !1 with v=u =  gives the maximand in the text.
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Equations (6) and (7) reect the condition that entry (vacancy creation)
occurs up to the point that the cost of vacancy creation is just o¤set by
the value of owning a vacancy. This value equals the probability of hiring
a worker times the expected surplus generated by a hire equal to 1 minus
the posted wage when a = 1 and to 1 minus the expected wage when a 2
f2; :::; Ag:
Note that  denotes the constrained Pareto e¢ cient level of labor market
tightness and  denotes the equilibrium level of labor market tightness. At
issue is the relationship between  and :
Proposition 3 Let u; v ! 1 with v=u =  and a 2 f1; :::; Ag xed. For
a = 1;  = : For a 2 f2; :::; Ag,  > :
Proof. Di¤erentiating equation (1) with respect to  gives
m(; a) = (1  
a
(1  e a=))a 1(1  e a=   a

e a=): (8)
For the case of a = 1; substituting this into equation (5) gives an implicit
expression for ;
cv = 1  e 1=   1

e 1=

:
Using equations (1) and (2) in equation (6) gives an implicit expression for
;
m(; 1)

(1  w(; 1)) = 1  e 1=   1

e 1=

:
Thus, equations (5) and (6) imply  =  when a = 1:
When a 2 f2; :::; Ag; equation (8) implies that  solves
cv = (1  

a
(1  e a=))a 1(1  e a=   a

e a=

); (9)
whereas, using equations (1) and (3),  (equation 7) solves
cv = (1  

a
(1  e a=))a 1(1  e a=): (10)
The right-hand sides of both (9) and (10) are decreasing in : Since the
right-hand side of (10) is greater than that of (9) for all  > 0; it follows
that  > :
Posting a vacancy has the standard congestion and thick-market e¤ects
in our model adding one more vacancy makes it more di¢ cult for the in-
cumbent vacancies to nd workers but makes it easier for the unemployed
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to generate o¤ers. A striking result of the competitive search equilibrium
literature is that adding one more vacancy causes the wage to adjust in such
a way as to balance these external e¤ects correctly. One way to interpret
this result is that competition leads to a wage that is the one that would sat-
isfy the Hosios (1990) condition in a Nash bargaining model. Equivalently,
one can say (Moen, 1997, p. 387) that the competitive search equilibrium
wage has the property that the marginal rate of substitution between labor
market tightness and the wage is the same for vacancies as for workers. The
rst part of Proposition 3 shows that this result holds when one uses an ex-
plicit urn-ball (a = 1) microfoundation for the matching function. However,
when workers make multiple applications, the result that  >  indicates
that the equilibrium level of vacancy creation is too high. Equivalently, the
equilibrium expected wage is below the level that would be indicated by the
Hosios condition. The e¤ects of the marginal vacancy are more complicated
with multiple applications than in the urn-ball model. Adding one more
vacancy makes it less likely that each incumbent vacancy attracts any appli-
cants but, conditional on attracting an applicant, makes it more likely that
the incumbent vacancy wins the racefor that applicant. Adding another
vacancy to the market puts upward pressure on the (expected) wage but not
to the extent required to achieve the e¢ cient level of entry.
It is interesting to note that the equilibrium outcome is again Pareto
e¢ cient when we let a!1: To see this, note that
m() = lim
a!1m(; a) = 1  e
 
and
() = lim
a!1(; a) =
1  e    e 
1  e 
and substitute these into the e¢ ciency and equilibrium conditions. This
result is Proposition 2.5 in JKK.
In a companion paper, Julien, Kennes, and King (2002) show that equi-
librium in a nite labor market with a = v is also constrained e¢ cient if
one assumes a particular wage determination mechanism; namely, vacancies
o¤ering jobs to workers who have no other o¤ers receive all of the surplus
(w = 0) but vacancies o¤ering jobs to workers who do have other o¤ers re-
ceive none of the surplus (w = 1). Julien, Kennes, and King (2002) interpret
this result in terms of what they call the Mortensen rule (Mortensen 1982)
that e¢ ciency in matching is attained if the initiatorof the match gets
the total surplus. By mimicking our proof of Proposition 2, we can show
that this assumed wage determination mechanism is in fact the symmetric
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equilibrium outcome in a directed search model with wage posting when
a = v in a nite labor market.
The intuition for why we nd constrained e¢ ciency with a = 1 and
as a ! 1 but not with a xed, nite number of multiple applications is
that with a = 1 and as a ! 1; only one coordination problem a¤ects
the operation of the labor market, whereas with a xed a 2 f2; :::; Ag; the
urn-ball and the multiple applications coordination problems operate simul-
taneously. Adjusting the wage can only solve one coordination problem at a
time. Specically, the social planner opens vacancies as long as the marginal
benet exceeds cv; while the market opens vacancies as long as the average
benet exceeds cv. When a = 1, the average benet of a vacancy equals the
marginal benet. When a 2 f2; :::; Ag, the average benet exceeds the mar-
ginal benet. Each additional vacancy increases the number of matches by
reducing the rst coordination friction, the one that workers impose on each
other, but at the same time it increases the second coordination friction, the
one that vacancies impose on each other. Both the market and the social
planner internalize the rst e¤ect, but the second e¤ect is not internalized
by the market. When workers apply to all vacancies, the rst coordination
friction is absent, but the second coordination friction reaches a maximum.
In this special case, the average benet of a vacancy once again equals the
marginal benet. This case can be viewed as one in which each vacancy
randomly applies to one worker. As noted above, as a ! 1; the matching
function becomes m() = 1  e . The average benet is the total number
of workers who receive exactly one o¤er divided by the total number of va-
cancies, m() (1  ()), which is identical to the RHS of equation (7). In
the limit as a!1; this is e , which is also m().3
4 Steady State
We now turn to steady-state analysis for a labor market with directed search
and multiple applications. We work with the limiting case in which u; v !1
with v=u =  and a 2 f2; :::; Ag xed. Since only the ratio of v to u matters
3The intuition for constrained e¢ ciency in a large labor market when a = 1 is quite
di¤erent from the intuition for the nite labor market case when a = v. In the former,
constrained e¢ ciency is a result of competition, and competition requires a labor market
su¢ ciently large that individual vacancies have negligible market power. When a = v;
constrained e¢ ciency is a result of perfect monopoly power  the entire surplus goes to
the vacancy if there is no competition for the applicant it selects and to the worker if he
or she winds up having the monopoly power. The monopoly intuition does not require
that the labor market be large.
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in the limiting case, we normalize the labor force to 1; thus, u is interpreted
as the unemployment rate.
In steady-state, workers ow into employment with probabililty m(; a)
per period. We assume that matches break up exogenously with probability
; giving the countervailing ow back into unemployment. Similarly, jobs
move from vacant to lled with probability
m(; a)

and back again with
probability . Steady-state analysis thus allows us to endogenize vacancies
and unemployment. More importantly, moving to the steady state means
that those unemployed who fail to nd an acceptable job in the current
period can wait and apply again in the future. In the case of a = 1; this is
not particularly interesting since, in equilibrium, there is no gain to waiting.
However, with multiple applications, the ability of the unemployed to hold
out for a situation in which vacancies engage in Bertrand competition for
their services, albeit at the cost of delay, implies a positive reservation wage.
This leads to a simple and appealing model in which labor market tightness
and the reservation wage are simultaneously determined. On the one hand,
the lower is the reservation wage of the unemployed, the more vacancies
rms want to create. On the other, as the labor market becomes tighter,
i.e., as  increases, the unemployed respond by increasing their reservation
wage.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Suppose the unemployed set a reser-
vation wage R: With multiple applications, the wage-posting problem for a
vacancy is qualitatively the same as in the one-period game. Whatever com-
mon wage might be posted at other vacancies, each individual vacancy has
the incentive to undercut. In the one-period game, this implies a monopsony
wage of w = 0; in the steady state, this same mechanism implies a dynamic
monopsony wage of w = R:4 To avoid complicated dynamics, we assume
that a vacancy that fails to hire its candidate in period t cannot carry its
queue of remaining applicants (if any) over to the next period. Similarly,
workers start with a new application round in each period, i.e., their earlier
applications are no longer on le.5 This implies that the probability that an
unemployed worker nds a job in any period and the probability that he or
she is hired at the competitive wage, conditional on nding a job, are the
4We restrict our attention to stationary strategies (as do JKK in their dynamic exten-
sion). That is, we rule out reputation mechanisms that might avert bidding wars. Since
any two vacancies that might consider avoiding a bidding war today interact directly in
any future period with probability zero, this seems reasonable. We consider a mechanism
that rules out Bertrand competition in a static setting in Section 5.3 below.
5A similar assumption is made in the standard random search model, namely, that a
worker and rm whose match is destroyed do not subsequently remember each other.
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same as in the single-period model; i.e., equations (1) and (3) for m(; a)
and (; a) continue to apply.
We begin by examining the value functions for jobs and for workers. A
job can be in one of three states vacant, lled paying the competitive wage,
and lled paying R: Let V; J(1); and J(R) be the corresponding values. The
value of a vacancy is
V =  cv+ 1
1 + r
fm(; a)

[(; a)J(1)+(1 (; a))J(R)]+(1 m(; a)

)V g:
Maintaining a vacancy entails a cost cv; which is incurred at the start of
each period. Moving to the end of the period, and thus discounting at
rate r; the vacancy has hired a worker with probability
m(; a)

. With
probability (; a); the worker who was hired had his or her wage bid up
to the competitive level, thus implying a value of J(1): With probability
1   (; a) the worker was hired at w = R; thus implying a value of J(R):
Finally, with probability 1   m(; a)

; the vacancy failed to hire, in which
case the value V is retained.
Free entry implies V = 0 so the analysis for vacancies remains the same;
that is, free entry turns the dynamic game into one that is essentially static
for vacancies. Given V = 0, there is no incentive for vacancies competing
for a worker to drop out of the Bertrand competition before the wage is
bid up to w = 1 (thus justifying the notation J(1)). This in turn implies
that we also have J(1) = 0: Inserting these equilibrium conditions into the
expression for V gives
m(; a)

(1  (; a))J(R) = cv(1 + r):
At the same time, the value of employing a worker at w = R is
J(R) = (1 R) + 1
1 + r
[(1  )J(R) + V ]:
Again using V = 0; we have
J(R) =
1 + r
r + 
(1 R):
Combining these equations gives the rst steady-state equilibrium condition,
cv =
m(; a)

(1  (; a))1 R
r + 
: (11)
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A worker also passes through three states unemployed, employed at
the competitive wage, and employed at R: The value of unemployment is
dened by
U =
1
1 + r
fm(; a)[(; a)N(1) + (1  (; a))N(R)] + (1 m(; a))Ug;
where N(1) and N(R) are the values of employment at w = 1 and w = R;
respectively. These latter two values are in turn dened by
N(1) = 1 +
1
1 + r
f(1  )N(1) + Ug
N(R) = R+
1
1 + r
f(1  )N(R) + Ug:
The reservation wage property, i.e., N(R) = U; then implies
U =
1 + r
r
R
N(1) =
(1 + r)
r(r + )
(r + R):
Inserting these expressions into the expression for U and rearranging gives
the second steady-state equilibrium condition,
R =
m(; a)(; a)
r +  +m(; a)(; a)
: (12)
The nal equation for the steady-state equilibrium is the standard ow
(Beveridge curve) condition for unemployment. Since the labor force is
normalized to 1, this is
u =

 +m(; a)
: (13)
Equations (12) and (13) show that, as is common in this class of models,
once labor market tightness () is determined, the other endogenous vari-
ables in this case, R and u are easily determined. Using equation (12)
to eliminate R from equation (11) gives the equation that determines the
steady-state equilibrium value of ; namely,
cv =
m(; a)

1  (; a)
r +  +m(; a)(; a)
: (14)
Using our results on the properties of m(; a) and (; a); we can show that
the right-hand side of equation (14) equals
1
r + 
as  ! 0; that it goes to
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zero as  ! 1; and that its derivative with respect to  is negative for all
 > 0: Equation (14) thus has a unique solution for each cv 2 (0; 1
r + 
]:
The natural next step is to compare equilibrium steady-state labor mar-
ket tightness with the constrained e¢ cient value of : The planners problem
is to choose the level of labor market tightness that maximizes the discounted
value of output net of vacancy costs for an innitely-lived economy.6 That
is, the planners problem is to maximize
1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
(1  ut   cvtut)
subject to
ut+1   ut = m(t; a)ut   (1  ut)
with u0 given.
The current-value Hamiltonian for this problem is
H(; u) = 1  u  cvu+ [m(; a)u  (1  u)]
with necessary conditions
@H
@
=  cvu+ m(; a)u = 0
r
:
 =  @H
@u
+ r = 1 + cv   [r +  +m(; a)]:
Evaluating at the steady-state, and eliminating ; gives
cv =
(1 + cv
)m(; a)
r +  +m(; a)
: (15)
Now we can compare the levels of labor market tightness implied by
equations (14) and (15). Using equations (1) and (3), equation (14) can be
rewritten as
cv(r++m(
; a)) = (1+cv)(1  

a
(1 e a=))a 1(1 e a=): (16)
6We consider only stationary solutions, but this is not likely to be restrictive in our
model. There are two standard reasons why a nonstationary solution might be optimal.
First, as shown in Shimer and Smith (2001), a nonstationary solution can be optimal in
a matching model with two-sided heterogeneity when agentscharacteristics are comple-
ments in production. A nonstationary solution may also be optimal if there are increasing
returns to scale in the matching function. Neither of these features is present in our model.
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Using equation (8), equation (15) can be rewritten as
cv (r +  +m(
; a)) = (1+cv)(1 

a
(1 e a=))a 1(1 e a=  a

e a=

):
(17)
As in the single-period analysis,  is the constrained e¢ cient level of labor
market tightness, i.e., the value of  that solves equation (15), and  is the
equilibrium level of labor market tightness, i.e., the value of  that solves
equation (14). Comparing equations (16) and (17) yields the following:
Proposition 4 Let u; v ! 1 with v=u =  and a 2 f2; :::; Ag xed. Then
in steady state,  > :
Proposition 4 indicates that, as in the single-period analysis, when the
unemployed make a xed number of multiple applications per period (a 2
f2; :::; Ag), equilibrium is constrained ine¢ cient. Specically, there is too
much vacancy creation. This result holds even though the ability of the
unemployed to reject o¤ers in favor of waiting for a more favorable outcome
in some future period implies a dynamic monopsony wage above the single-
period monopsony wage of zero.
Finally, note that the marginal benet (MB) of opening a vacancy, the
RHS of equation (17), is
(1 e a= a

e a=)
(1 e a=) times the average benet (AB) ,
the RHS of equation (16). This ratio is the same in the one-period model and
is equal to the probability that a rm receives 2 or more applications condi-
tional on receiving at least 1 application. Call this conditional probability
P . Each additional vacancy attracts applications from other vacancies and
consequently increases the probability that multiple vacancies must compete
for the same candidate, the second coordination problem. The extent of this
negative externality is proportional to P . As a increases, both the MB and
the AB increase but the MB increases faster, and in the limit as a ! 1,
P ! 1 and MB=AB. This does not mean that the labor market becomes
more e¢ cient. To the contrary, the matching rate goes down. Increasing a
simply makes the planners problem more di¢ cult. In the next section, we
endogenize a and show that workers typically apply to too many jobs.
5 Extensions and Robustness Checks
In this section, we focus on three simplifying assumptions that we made in
our basic model. These assumptions are: (i) that the number of applications
sent out by each worker is a parameter of the search technology, (ii) that
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each vacancy can process at most one application per period, and (iii) that
two or more vacancies competing for the same worker engage in Bertrand
competition for that workers services. Accordingly, we examine what hap-
pens to our results if (i) the number of applications per worker is a choice
variable, (ii) each vacancy can process at most two applications, and (iii)
vacancies pursue strategies that rule out Bertrand competition.
5.1 Endogenous a
We have assumed that each worker makes a applications, where a 2 f1; 2; :::; Ag
is exogenously given. Since the equilibrium level of labor market tightness
is e¢ cient when a = 1 but ine¢ cient when a 2 f2; :::; Ag, it is natural to
ask whether  and under what circumstances  workers would choose to
make only one application or more than one. In addressing this question,
we consider only pure-strategy symmetric equilibria in application strate-
gies. That is, assuming that all other workers make a applications, under
what conditions (taking into account how rms react to all workers choosing
a) is it in the individual workers interest also to choose a? Our objective
is to determine whether our ine¢ ciency results are robust with respect to
endogenizing a in this way.
To make endogenizing a an interesting problem, there must be a cost
associated with applications, so we assume that each application costs ca to
submit. In the one-shot game, there are then only 2 exogenous parameters,
the cost of posting a vacancy, cv; and the cost of submitting an application,
ca: We need only consider 0  cv  1 and 0  ca  1 since worker output
equals 1 and if cv > 1; no rm would post a vacancy, and if ca > 1; no
worker would make an application. Thus for each (cv; ca) in the unit square
we can ask (i) what are the free-entry equilibrium values of  and a and (ii)
what values of  and a would a social planner choose?
We start with the equilibrium problem and ask: For what values of
(cv; ca) is a = 1 consistent with equilibrium? For what values of (cv; ca) is
a = 2 consistent with equilibrium? Etc. We address this question numeri-
cally as follows.
Consider a candidate equilibrium in which all workers make a applica-
tions. Then, for each ; we know what wage vacancies choose to post (from
equation (2) if a = 1; zero if a 2 f2; :::; Ag), and we know m(; a). We pick
a value of cv from a grid over (0; 1): From the free-entry condition (equa-
tion (6) if a = 1; equation (7) otherwise), there is a corresponding implied
value of . We then ask, using the value of  implied by the free-entry
condition, for what values of ca is an individual workers expected payo¤
18
maximized by choosing to send out the same number of applications as all
other workers do? We answer this numerically by comparing the expected
payo¤ associated with choosing a when all other workers also choose a with
those associated with choosing a 1; a 2; ::: and a+1; a+2; :::; etc.7 For the
particular cv that we chose, this gives us a range of values for ca. We then
repeat for the next value of cv; etc. The outcome of this algorithm is the set
of (cv; ca) combinations in the unit square that are consistent with a pure-
strategy symmetric equilibrium in which all workers make a applications.
We carry out this process for a wide range of values for a.
Next, we address the social planners problem. Given (cv; ca); the natural
social planner problem is
max
;a
m(; a)  cv   caa;
where   0 and a 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g: We know this problem is concave in  for
a given a: Thus, if (; a) solves the social planner problem, we must have
cv = m(
; a);
and  = (a; cv) has a unique solution. We can plug this back into
the social planners objective and maximize numerically with respect to a:
This gives a (and ) as functions of (cv; ca): We can then compare the
equilibrium unit square with the social planner unit square.
The qualitative results of this exercise are as follows. First, although
there are many parameter congurations for which the equilibrium number
of applications, a, equals 1; this outcome requires relatively high values of
ca: Second, the equilibrium number of applications increases as ca falls (as
one would expect). Third, there are parameter congurations that admit
multiple equilibria. This reects a complementarity between workersand
rmsstrategies. For example, if all workers choose a = 1; then vacancies
post a positive wage, w(; 1) > 0: For some values of  (equivalently, for some
values of cv) it is not worthwhile for workers to submit a second application.
On the other hand, if all workers choose a = 2; then w = 0; and it cannot
be worthwhile for a worker to deviate to a = 1: Fourth, there are many
parameter congurations for which no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium
exists. One parameter region in which this is the case is the set of (cv; ca)
combinations in which individual workers would prefer not to send out any
7This comparison can be carried out in a nite number of steps since the maximum
number of applications a worker might make is limited by the requirement that the total
cost of submitting applications be less than one.
19
applications when all other workers choose a = 1: This occurs when both cv
and ca are relatively high. There are, however, other (cv; ca) combinations
for which no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists. Fifth, for relatively
low values of ca; there are parameter regions with unique equilibria at a =
2; a = 3; etc.
In the parameter regions in which a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium
(or equilibria) exists, we nd a  a: Specically, there are parameter
congurations for which a = a = 1 (where a = 1 may either be unique
or one of two or more equilibrium possibilities). However, when a  2;
we nd a > a: This occurs when cv and ca are low relative to the output
produced by a match. That is, for what we view as reasonable values of cv
and ca; the equilibrium number of applications exceeds the socially optimal
value. The reason is simply that individual workers, when deciding how
many applications to submit, fail to take into account the externality they
impose on other workers. The countervailing externality that one might
expect  that an increase in worker applications should make it easier for
rms to ll their vacancies does not obtain because of the coordination
failure among vacancies.
Finally, endogenizing a does not a¤ect our basic e¢ ciency result for labor
market tightness. For (cv; ca) combinations such that a = a = 1, we, of
course, have  = : For parameter congurations such that a > a;
we typically nd  > : For a small set of parameter congurations,
however, we nd  < : This appears at rst glance to be inconsistent with
Proposition 3, but note that in that Proposition, we imposed the restriction
that a = a; which need not hold when we endogenize a: In any event, the
bottom line of this exercise is clear. The assumption that a is an exogenous
parameter of the search technology, which we made in order to make our
basic model as transparent as possible, is not driving our results on the
ine¢ ciency e¤ects of multiple applications.
5.2 Shortlisting
Our ine¢ ciency result is based on a double coordination failure. Not only are
workers unable to coordinate in terms of where they send their applications,
but vacancies are unable to coordinate in terms of which applicants they try
to hire. In our basic model, we represented the coordination failure among
vacancies in a clean but extreme way. A natural question is the extent to
which our results depend on our assumption that each vacancy could pursue
at most one applicant.
To address this question, we now consider a version of the basic one-shot
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model in which each vacancy can make up to two o¤ers. Specically, we
assume that vacancies form short listsas follows. If two or more workers
apply to a vacancy, the vacancy selects two applicants at random and rejects
the others. It selects one of its chosen applicants to receive its rst-round
o¤er. The other applicant, if she is not hired by another vacancy in the
rst round, gets a second-round o¤er in the event that the vacancy doesnt
hire in the rst round. If only one worker applies to a vacancy, then that
worker gets the vacancys rst-round o¤er. To keep the algebra as simple as
possible, we analyze this model for the case of a = 2:
This extension makes our model far more di¢ cult. The basic reason
is that when a worker thinks about applying to a vacancy that is deviat-
ing from the putative equilibrium wage, the indi¤erence condition becomes
considerably more complicated. A workers application strategy a¤ects the
probabilities of being placed on 0; 1; or 2 short lists; the worker could be
in rst or second place on these short lists, etc. In addition, an interme-
diate wage arises in this model. Consider two vacancies competing for the
same applicant in the rst round. If either or both of these vacancies has a
second-round candidate, then Bertrand competition in the rst round stops
before the competitive level.
Our analysis of shortlisting follows the same road map that we used
for our basic model. We rst derive the matching probability, assuming a
symmetric equilibrium posted wage. Second, taking  as given, we derive
the symmetric equilibrium wage posting strategy for vacancies. Finally, we
characterize the free-entry equilibrium level of labor market tightness and
the corresponding constrained e¢ cient level and compare the two. The
central result of our analysis still holds the equilibrium level of  exceeds
the e¢ cient level.
Because the details of the shortlisting extension are very tedious, we
present the analysis in Appendix C. Here, in the text, we simply summarize
and comment on our results.
We begin with the matching probability. Assuming the existence of a
symmetric equilibrium posted wage, that is, assuming that all vacancies are
equally attractive ex ante, the probability that a worker nds a job is
m() = 1  (1  q1)2(1  q2)2; (18)
where q1 is the probability that an application leads to a rst-round o¤er
and q2 is the probability that an application leads to a second-round o¤er
given that it does not generate a rst-round o¤er. An explanation of the
form of m() and expressions for q1 and q2 are given in Appendix C. Note
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that the probability that an application leads to a rst-round o¤er is the
same as the probability that the application would have generated an o¤er
had there been only one round; i.e., q1 = q (from the basic model). The
obvious result thus follows, namely, for each value of ; shortlisting increases
the probability that a worker nds a job.
From the social planners perspective, the only e¤ect of shortlisting is to
change the form of m(): The e¤ect on equilibrium is, however, much more
complicated. For low values of ; the equilibrium analysis is qualitatively
similar to the one we carried out for our basic model. All vacancies post
a wage of zero. Bertrand competition for an applicant who has two rst-
round o¤ers either drives the wage to the competitive level (if neither of
the competing vacancies has a second-round candidate) or to the interme-
diate wage (if at least one of the vacancies has a second-round candidate).
An applicant who, having failed to get any rst-round o¤ers, gets a single
second-round o¤er receives the monopsony wage (zero). An applicant who
gets two second-round o¤ers receives a wage of one.
For higher values of  (the cuto¤ value is approximately  = 0:42), there
are multiple equilibria. For example, when  = 1; any wage in the interval
[0:20; 0:23] (approximately) is consistent with equilibrium. The reason for
multiple equilibria has to do with the discontinuity in the derivative of ex-
pected prot with respect to the potential deviants wage at the equilibrium
wage. The reason that w = 0 is not an equilibrium posted wage for higher
values of  has to do with the change in application incentives implied by
shortlisting. In our basic model, a worker whose application is accepted by
more than one vacancy necessarily receives a wage of one, and workers are
willing to apply to vacancies posting w = 0 in hopes of hitting the jackpot.
With shortlisting, however, a worker can wind up with the posted wage even
if both of her applications are accepted specically, if she is rst on one
vacancys short list and second on the others. (When  is low, w = 0 arises
even with shortlisting due to a lack of competition among vacancies.)
Whether  is low, so w = 0 is the unique posted wage, or  is high,
so there are multiple equilibria, workers can receive three di¤erent wages
the posted wage, the intermediate wage, and the competitive wage. The
intermediate wage, s; is determined by
1  s = (1  q1)(1  q2)(1  w): (19)
The left-hand side of this expression is the prot that a vacancy realizes
if it hires its rst-round candidate at wage s: The right-hand side is the
expected prot for a vacancy that received two applications should it choose
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to proceed to the second round. With probability 1 q1 the vacancys second-
place candidate will still be available after the rst round. Conditional on
still being available, this candidate will fail to get a competing second round
o¤er with probability 1  q2: The vacancy then realizes a prot of 1  w:
For each value of ; the next step is to compute the expected prot of
a vacancy, say (): When there are multiple equilibria, we use the highest
possible equilibrium wage. At this wage, () is at its lowest possible level;
hence the incentive to create vacancies is as small as possible. The free-entry
equilibrium value of labor market tightness, ; is determined by
cv = (
);
which is analogous to equation (7) in our basic model. The e¢ cient value
of labor market tightness, ; is determined by
cv = m
0();
precisely as in the basic model. The only e¤ect of shortlisting is to change
the form of m():
It is straightforward to compute m0() and () numerically. Both of
these functions are positive and decreasing in ; and () > m0() for each
 > 0: Equivalently,  > : That is, the central result of our basic model,
namely, that there is excessive vacancy creation in free-entry equilibrium,
continues to hold when we extend our model to allow for shortlisting.
There are, of course, other ways to relax the assumption that each va-
cancy can process at most one application. We feel, however, that we have
done so in a reasonable and realistic way. The fact that  >  contin-
ues to hold when we allow for shortlisting suggests that our result on the
ine¢ ciency of competitive search equilibrium when workers make multiple
applications is robust to the assumption that vacancies can consider at most
one application. When a rm opens a vacancy, it does not internalize the
cost that it imposes on other vacancies (the second coordination problem).
Even if we were to allow vacancies to make their shortlists longer, they can
still lose all their candidates to competitors. In other words, shortlisting
reduces the second coordination problem but does not eliminate it.
5.3 O¤er-Beating Strategies
In our basic model, we assumed that if a worker received o¤ers from two or
more vacancies, those vacancies would then engage in Bertrand competition
for the workers services. Although the Bertrand assumption is standard in
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the literature, it can be debated in our environment. A vacancy that is about
to lose a worker to a rival should be indi¤erent between letting the worker
take the other job versus entering into Bertrand competition. After all, both
policies, conceding or competing, lead to the same zero-prot outcome.
Simply assuming that each vacancy announces a common wage w and
then refuses to engage in ex post bidding is, of course, not satisfactory.8 If
all vacancies were to follow such a strategy, then a deviant could prot by
increasing its wage o¤er whenever its chosen applicant had other o¤ers. This
leads us to consider o¤er-beating strategies.
We dene such strategies as follows:
1. Post w:
2. If all other vacancies pursuing the same applicant post w or less, con-
tinue to o¤er w.
3. If at least one other vacancy pursuing the same applicant posts w0 > w
or makes a countero¤er w0 > w, make a countero¤er above w0: If one or
more rivals makes a countero¤er to the countero¤er, respond in kind;
i.e., engage in Bertrand competition.
Of course, these strategies only are relevant when workers make more than
one application.
O¤er-beating strategies are analogous to the price-beating strategies that
have been used in the industrial organization literature to rule out Bertrand
competition in prices. Price-beating strategies are sometimes used in that
literature as a foundation for kinked demand curves(e.g., Tirole 1988, pp.
243-45). Typically, there is a continuum of price-beating Nash equilibria 
absent any consideration of equilibrium renements, there is a continuum of
prices at which the demand curve can kink.
We begin our analysis of o¤er-beating equilibria taking  as given. We
rst show that for each ; there is a continuum of o¤er-beating Nash equi-
libria. These are indexed by w; where w ranges from the monopsony level
(zero) to an upper bound that is increasing in : The more di¢ cult it is
8 If one were nonetheless simply to assume that ex post bidding is not allowed, then
there would be no common equilibrium posted wage. Suppose all vacancies post a wage
of w: Then, assuming that a worker who has multiple o¤ers accepts the highest one and
so long as w is not too close to one, it is in the interest of any one vacancy to post a
slightly higher wage. Once w is su¢ ciently close to one, a vacancy can prot by lowering
its wage to the minimum level consistent with attracting one or more applications with
some positive probability.
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for vacancies to attract workers at any given wage, i.e., the higher is ; the
greater is the range of wages that can be supported as o¤er-beating Nash
equilibria. In terms of choosing among these equilibria, a common o¤er-
beating strategy with w = 0 is the obvious focal point. Nonetheless, we
continue to consider all the possible o¤er-beating Nash equilibria. We do
this to emphasize the scope of our second result when we allow for free
entry, i.e., when we endogenize ; all of these equilibria are ine¢ cient. In
particular, all exhibit excess vacancy creation.
Proposition 5 Let w(; a) =
a

e a=
1  e a= : There exists a continuum of
symmetric o¤er-beating Nash equilibria indexed by w 2 [0; w(; a)].
The strategy of proof is simple. We rst show that if all vacancies follow
an o¤er-beating strategy at any common posted wage w; it is never in the
interest of any one vacancy to post a higher wage, w0: Posting a higher wage
increases the probability of attracting an applicant. This is benecial only
if that applicant receives no other o¤ers. We place an upper bound on the
expected benet associated with an upward deviation in the posted wage
by supposing that an arbitrarily small increase in the posted wage above w
attracts one or more applicants with probability one. Nevertheless, it is not
protable to post w0 > w: The increase in the probability of attracting an
applicant is outweighed by the decrease in the probability that the vacancy
will receive a positive prot from that worker. Second, we check that a
downward deviation, i.e., w0 < w; is not protable. This is the case for all
w 2 [0; w(; a)] : The argument is essentially the same as the one we used
for the case of a = 1 in the proof of Proposition 2. The details are given in
Appendix D.
The next step is to allow for free entry. Suppose all vacancies follow an
o¤er-beating strategy with a posted wage of w: The equilibrium value of 
is then determined as usual by
cv =
m()

(1  w):
Now, however, any w 2 [0; w(; a)] is consistent with symmetric Nash equi-
librium, so there is a corresponding range of  that is consistent with free-
entry equilibrium. The lowest possible equilibrium level of labor market
tightness is the one associated with w(; a): Call this lowest possible equi-
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librium value of labor market tightness : Then  solves
cv =
1 

1  

a
(1  e a=)
a

 
1  a

e a=
 
1  e a=
!
:
As usual, let q =

a
(1  e a=): The free-entry condition is then
cv =
1  (1  q)a
aq
(1  e a=   a

e a=

): (20)
The planners problem is unchanged, so the e¢ cient level of labor market
tightness, ; is again the solution to
cv = (1  

a
(1  e a=))a 1(1  e a=   a

e a=

);
cf., equation (9). This condition can be rewritten as
cv = (1  q)a 1(1  e a=   a

e a=

): (21)
Since 1  (1  q)a > aq(1  q)a 1 so long as a  2 (by the properties of the
binomial), the right hand side of (20) is greater than the right hand side of
(21) for each  > 0: That is,  > : We thus have:
Proposition 6 There is excessive vacancy creation in any symmetric o¤er-
beating Nash equilibrium.
The point of Proposition 6 is clear. The ine¢ ciency associated with multiple
applications is not an artifact of assuming ex post Bertrand competition for
applicants. O¤er-beating strategies are a particular alternative to Bertrand
competition. They create rents for vacancies which are absent in a com-
petitive environment. In a free-entry equilibrium, these rents translate into
excessive entry and wages that are too low. In fact, any strategy that reduces
competition will have this e¤ect.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we construct an equilibrium search model of a large labor
market in which workers, after observing all posted wages, submit a xed
number of applications, a 2 f1; :::Ag; to the vacancies that they nd most
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attractive. We derive the symmetric equilibrium matching probability and
the common posted wage. When a = 1; our analysis is a large labor market
version of BSW. However, when a 2 f2; :::Ag; i.e., when workers make mul-
tiple applications, the symmetric equilibrium of our model is radically di¤er-
ent. With multiple applications, the match probability in our model reects
the interplay of two coordination failures an urn-ball failure among work-
ers and a multiple-application failure among vacancies. In addition, when
workers make more than one application, all vacancies post the monopsony
wage, but there is dispersion in wages paid. Workers who receive only one
job o¤er are paid the monopsony wage, but those who receive multiple of-
fers get the competitive wage. When workers make a single application or
when they apply to an arbitrarily large number of vacancies, equilibrium
is constrained e¢ cient; but when workers make a nite number of multiple
applications, too many vacancies are posted. These results, both positive
and normative, carry over from the single-period model to a steady-state
framework and they are robust with respect to reasonable variations in our
key assumptions.
Directed search is an appealing way to model equilibrium unemploy-
ment and wage dispersion. In reality, workers do direct their applications to
attractive vacancies, but unemployment nonetheless persists as a result of
coordination failures on both sides of the labor market. In addition, those
workers who are lucky enough to generate competition for their services
do in fact have their wages bid up. The contribution of our paper is to
show that these realistic features can be captured in a tractable equilibrium
model and, more importantly, that when these features are incorporated,
equilibrium is not constrained e¢ cient.
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Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
We now sketch the proof of Proposition 1. The full proof is given in Albrecht
et. al. (2004). We computem(; a) as follows. The probability that a worker
nds a job is one minus the probability that he or she gets no job o¤ers.
Consider a worker who applies to a vacancies, and let the random variables
X1; X2; :::; Xa be the number of competitors that he or she has at vacancy 1,
vacancy 2, ..., vacancy a: The probability that the worker gets no job o¤ers
can be expressed asX
:::
X x1
x1 + 1
x2
x2 + 1
:::
xa
xa + 1
P [X1 = x1; X2 = x2; :::Xa = xa]:
In general, the random variables X1; X2; :::; Xa are not independent, making
the computation of the joint probability a di¢ cult one. (Albrecht et. al.
2004 and Philip 2003 give an expression for the joint probability.) The
intuition for dependence is simple. Consider, for example, a labor market in
which u and v are small and in which each worker makes a = 2 applications.
Then, if a worker has relatively many competitors at the rst vacancy to
which he or she applies, it is more likely that his or her second application has
relatively few competitors. The key to Proposition 1 is that this dependence
vanishes in the limit. In the limit, the fact that a worker has an unexpectedly
large number of competitors at one vacancy says nothing about the number
of competitors he or she faces elsewhere. The joint probability then equals
the product of the marginals, and the probability that a worker gets at least
one o¤er can be computed as 1  
P x
x+1P [X = x]
a
: As u; v ! 1 with
v=u = ; the number of competitors an applicant faces at any particular
vacancy, X; converges in distribution to a Poisson (a ) random variable. A
straightforward computation then gives equation (1).
If a = 1; there is no problem of dependence. The number of competitors
that a worker has at the vacancy to which he or she applies is a bin(u 1; 1v )
random variable. The probability that a worker gets an o¤er is then
1 
u 1X
x=0
x
x+ 1

u  1
x

1
v
x
1  1
v
u 1 x
=
v
u

1  (1  1
v
)u

:
With a change in notation, this result is the same as the one given in BSW.
Taking the limit of this matching probability as u; v ! 1 with v=u = 
gives m(; 1) = (1   e 1=); as equation (1) implies. The case of a = v
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is the polar opposite. In this case, X1 = X2 = ::: = Xa = u   1 with
probability one, so the probability a worker gets an o¤er is 1  (u 1u )v; as in
JKK. Taking the limit as u; v !1 with v=u =  gives
m() = 1  e :
The same expression can be derived by taking the limit of m(; a) as a!1
in equation (1).
B Proof of Proposition 2
As discussed in the text, we need to show that when a = 1; the wage
w(; 1) has the property that if all vacancies, with the possible exception
of a potential deviant (D), post that wage, then it is also in Ds interest to
post w(; 1). When a 2 f2; :::; Ag; we need to show that no matter what
common wage is posted by other vacancies, it is always in Ds interest to
undercut, thus driving w(; a) to zero.
Suppose D posts a wage of w0 and that each nondeviant vacancy (N)
posts w: Then Ds expected prot is
(w0;w) = (1 w0)P [D gets at least one application]P [selected applicant has no other o¤er]
Let k be the probability that any one worker applies to D. In symmetric
equilibrium, k must be the same for all workers. As u ! 1, k must go to
zero; otherwise, any applicant to D would have an innity of competitors
and therefore would get the job at D with probability zero. We let u!1
and k ! 0 in such a way that ku =  stays constant; thus, in a large
labor market, the number of applications sent to D is a Poisson () random
variable. We therefore have
P [D gets at least one application] = 1  e :
The parameter  depends on w0, w and  through an indi¤erence condition,
which we develop below. Finally, the last term on the right-hand side of
(w0;w) can be written as
P [selected applicant has no other o¤er] = (1  qN )a 1;
where qN is the probability that any one application to an N vacancy leads
to an o¤er. We thus have
(w0;w) = (1  w0)(1  e )(1  qN )a 1:
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The parameter  determines the probability (call it qD) that a worker
who applies to D gets an o¤er from that vacancy, as follows:
qD =
1X
x=0
1
x+ 1
e x
x!
=
1

(1  e ):
To understand this expression, note that (i) a worker who has x competitors
at D gets the o¤er from D with probability
1
x+ 1
and (ii) the number of
competitors faced by a worker who applies to D is Poisson (): The proba-
bility that an application to an N vacancy leads to an o¤er is derived in a
similar fashion:
qN =
1X
x=0
1
x+ 1
e a=(a )
x
x!
=

a
(1  e a=):
The number of potential competitors at an N vacancy goes to innity, the
probability that any one potential competitor applies to the N vacancy in
question goes to zero, and the product of these two terms goes to a=; so
the number of competitors faced by an applicant to an N vacancy is Poisson
(
a

). Note that qN does not depend on w0.
We now develop the indi¤erence condition, which denes  as a function
of w0 given w and : Each worker must be indi¤erent between sending all a
applications to N vacancies versus sending 1 application to D and the other
a 1 to N vacancies. The expected payo¤ from sending all applications to N
vacancies depends on neither  nor w0 and can thus be treated as a constant.
The expected payo¤ from sending one application to D and the others to N
vacancies does, of course, depend on  and w0:
The possible payo¤s for a worker who sends 1 application to D and the
other a  1 to N vacancies are
(i) 1 if 2 or more applications are accepted.
This occurs with probability
qD(1  (1  qN )a 1) + (1  qD)(1  (1  qN )a 1   (a  1)qN (1  qN )a 2)
= 1  (1  qN )a 1   (1  qD)(a  1)qN (1  qN )a 2:
(ii) w0 if only the application to D is successful.
This occurs with probability qD(1  qN )a 1:
(iii) w if the application to D is unsuccessful and only one application to N
is successful.
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This occurs with probability (1  qD)(a  1)qN (1  qN )a 2:
(iv) 0 if no applications are successful.
This occurs with probability (1  qD)(1  qN )a 1
The expected payo¤ for a worker who sends 1 application to D and a  1 to
N is thus
1 (1 qN )a 1 (1 qD)(a 1)qN (1 qN )a 2+w0qD(1 qN )a 1+w(1 qD)(a 1)qN (1 qN )a 2:
Equating this to the expected payo¤ from applying only to N vacancies
implicitly denes (w0;w; ): Di¤erentiating with respect to w0; taking into
account that
dqD
d
=  1  e
    e 
2
; and substituting for qD and qN gives
d
dw0
=
(1  e )(1  a(1  e a=))
(1  e    e )  (a  1) a(1  e a=)(1  w) + w0(1  a(1  e a=))
Since 1   e x   xe x > 0 for all x > 0 and 1  w; we have d
dw0
> 0 (as
expected) and
d2
dw02
< 0:
Turning back to Ds optimization problem, (w0;w) is proportional to
(1   w0)(1   e ): Maximizing with respect to w0; the rst-order (Kuhn-
Tucker) condition is
 (1  e ) + (1  w0)e  d
dw0
 0 with equality if w0 > 0:
Note that if there is an interior solution, the second-order condition holds.
We are interested in the possibility of an interior solution at w0 = w:
Consider rst the case of a = 1: If w0 = w; then  = 1=. Substituting and
solving gives
w(; 1) =
e 1=
(1  e 1=) ,
as given in equation (2).
Consider next the case of a 2 f2; :::; Ag: In this case w0 = w implies
 = a=. Substituting the expression for
d
dw0
into the Kuhn-Tucker condition
gives
(1  w)e (1  1 (1  e ))
(1  e    e )

(a  1)1 (1  e )(1  w) + w(1  1 (1  e ))
  1
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This can be rewritten as
2e  + (a  2)e (1  e )  (a  1)2(1  e )2
(1  e )  w( a(1 e
 )+(a 1)2(1 e )2)
Only a corner solution exists with w(; a) = 0 if this is a strict inequality.
Note that as  ! 0; the RHS ! 0 and, using LHôpitals Rule, so does
the LHS. Note also that
dRHS
d
= w(1  ae  + (a  1)2(1  e )2 + 2(a  1)2(1  e )e ) > 0;
while
dLHS
d
=
 e ((1  e )2((a  1)(a  2) + (a  2)) + (1  e    )2
(1  e )2 ;
which is negative for a 2 f2; :::; Ag: Thus, in this case, we have a corner
solution with w(; a) = 0:
Finally to derive (; a); note that in symmetric equilibrium qN = qD 
q = a(1  e a=): A fraction 1  (1  q)a of all workers get a job. A fraction
1   (1   q)a   a(1   q)a 1 of all workers receive multiple o¤ers. Thus, a
fraction
1  (1  q)a   a(1  q)a 1
1  (1  q)a
of the workers who nd a job receive the competitive wage. Substituting for
q gives equation (3). QED
C Shortlisting
C.1 Derivation of the matching probability
We rst derive m() for a worker (call her A). Let q1 be the probability
that an application leads to a rst-round o¤er. Let q2 be the probability
that an application would lead to a second round o¤er given it does not
generate a rst-round o¤er. Recall that we are assuming that workers make
two applications. We then have
m() = 1  (1  q1)2+(1  q1)2(1  (1  q2)2) = 1  (1  q1)2(1  q2)2: (22)
The probability that A gets an o¤er in the rst round is 1  (1  q1)2: The
probability that she gets an o¤er in the second round is the probability that
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she fails to get a rst-round o¤er, (1  q1)2, times the probability of getting
a second-round o¤er conditional on not having received an o¤er in the rst
round, 1  (1  q2)2:
The calculation of q1 is as before. Suppose A applies to vacancy V. Let
Y be the number of other applications to V. Y is Poisson (2=): Then
q1 =
1X
y=0
1
y + 1
P [Y = y] =

2
(1  e 2=): (23)
Now suppose A applies to V and doesnt get a rst-round o¤er (neither
from V nor from the other vacancy to which she applies). The probability
that A gets a second-round o¤er from V is q2:
To compute q2 some notation is useful. Let C1 = 1 if A gets a 1st-round
o¤er from V; 0 otherwise. Thus, P [C1 = 1] = q1: Similarly, let C2 = 1 if A
gets a second-round o¤er from V; 0 otherwise. Assuming that A did not get
a rst-round o¤er from the other vacancy to which she applied (in which
case, the following computations are not relevant), we have
q2 = P [C2 = 1jC1 = 0]:
Suppose C1 = 0. Then V made a rst-round o¤er to some other worker
 call him B. In order for A to get a second-round o¤er from V, it must
be that V failed to hire B in the rst round. This can occur in two ways.
First, B gets a second rst-round o¤er, and the vacancy (call it V*) making
this other o¤er has no second-round candidate. This occurs with probability
e 2=:9 Second, B gets a second rst-round o¤er, the vacancy making the
o¤er has a second-round candidate, and B chooses the other vacancy. This
occurs with probability
q1
1  e 2=q1
2
= (q1   e 2=)=2:
9B gets the other rst-round o¤er with probability q1: Let C1 = 1 if B gets a rst-round
o¤er from V* , and let Y be the number of workers in addition to B who applied to V* :
Then V* has no second candidate on its short list if Y = 0: Using Bayes Law,
P [Y = 0jC1 = 1] = P [C1 = 1jY = 0]P [Y = 0]
P [C1 = 1]
=
e 2=
q1
:
We thus have
P [C1 = 1 and Y = 0] = q1
e 2=
q1
= e 2=:
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The probability that V fails to hire in the rst round is thus
e 2= +
q1   e 2=
2
=
q1 + e
 2=
2
:
Next, given that A is not rst on Vs short list, what is the probability
that she is second? If y applicants other than A applied to V, and if one of
those applicants was chosen to be rst on Vs short list, then there are y 1
remaining applicants with whom A is competing for second place. Given y;
the probability that A is second is thus 1=y: To nd the probability that
A is second on Vs short list, given that she is not rst, we need to sum
this conditional probability against the probability mass function for Y: We
know that unconditionally, Y is Poisson (2=):We also know that V did not
make an o¤er to A in the rst round, i.e., C1 = 0: So,
P [Y = yjC1 = 0] = P [C1 = 0jY = y]P [Y = y]
P [C1 = 0]
=
y
y+1e
 2=(2 )
y=y!
1  q1 =
ye 2=(2 )
y=(y + 1)!
1  q1 for y = 0; 1; :::
The probability that A is second on Vs short list given that she was not
rst is then
1X
y=1
1
y
P [Y = yjC1 = 0] =
1X
y=1
e 2=(2 )
y=(y + 1)!
1  q1 =
q1   e 2=
1  q1
and
q2 = P [C2 = 1jC1 = 0] =
 
q1 + e
 2=
2
! 
q1   e 2=
1  q1
!
: (24)
Substitution then gives m():
C.2 Expected Prot for a Vacancy
The e¢ cient level of labor market tightness is determined as before by cv =
m(
): That is, from the social planners perspective, the only e¤ect of
allowing for shortlisting is to change the form of m():We want to compare
the e¢ cient level of labor market tightness, ; with the corresponding free-
entry equilibrium value, : Assuming for now the existence of a symmetric
equilibrium posted wage, the free-entry value of labor market tightness is
determined by cv = (w()); where w() is the symmetric equilibrium
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posted wage given labor market tightness  and (w()) is expected prot
net of the cost of vacancy creation for a vacancy that posts the equilibrium
wage in a market with labor market tightness : In this subsection, we derive
the general form of ():
Suppose all vacancies post w: The number of applications that any one
vacancy receives is Poisson with parameter 2=: Vacancy V gets no applica-
tions (and thus no prot) with probability e 2=; it receives one application
(and thus has only one applicant on its short list) with probability 2e
 2=; it
receives two or more applications (and thus has two applicants on its short
list) with probability 1  e 2=   2e 2=:
Suppose V has only one applicant (again, call her A) on its short list.
With probability 1   q1; A does not receive a competing o¤er in the rst
round, in which case Vs prot is 1   w:10 With probability q1; A has a
competing rst-round o¤er. The other vacancy (V*) has only this applicant,
i.e., no one in second place on its short list, with probability e
 2=
q1
:11 In this
case, the two vacancies drive the wage to 1 (and prot to zero) through
Bertrand competition. With probability 1  e 2=q1 ; however, V* has a second-
round choice. In this case, Bertrand competition pushes the wage to s; the
maximum wage V* is willing to pay rather than dropping out to proceed to
the second round, and V realizes a prot of 1  s:
This highest wage, s; that a vacancy with two applicants on its short list
is willing to pay in the rst round is determined by
1  s = (1  q1)(1  q2)(1  w): (25)
The right-hand side can be understood as follows. With probability 1  q1;
a vacancys second-place candidate is still available after the rst round.
Conditional on still being available, she fails to get a competing second-
round o¤er with probability 1   q2: The vacancy then realizes a prot of
1  w:
Summarizing, a vacancy has only one applicant on its short list with
probability 2e
 2=: In this case, the vacancys expected prot is
(1  q1)(1  w) + (q1   e 2=)(1  s):
10A accepts any w  0:Were she instead to hold out in hopes of receiving a second-round
o¤er from the other vacancy to which she applied, she could not do better than w: The
reason is that there cannot be competition for As services in the second round. Of course,
if workers each make a > 2 applications, then there is a nontrivial rst-round reservation
wage problem for workers. It would be straightforward, but algebraically tedious, to add
this feature.
11The derivation is given in footnote 9.
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Now suppose V receives two or more applications. Vs rst-round choice
(again, call her A) fails to get a competing rst-round o¤er with probability
1  q1; in which case Vs prot is 1 w: With probability q1; A does receive
a competing rst-round o¤er. The other vacancy competing for A (call it
V*) has no second-round candidate with probability e
 2=
q1
: In this case, V is
outbid and proceeds to the second round. Vs second-round choice (call him
B) is still available with probability 1   q1: Given that he is still available,
B receives no competing second round o¤er with probability 1   q2; and
Vs prot is 1   w: If B does receive a competing second-round o¤er, then
Bertrand competition drives prot to zero. Alternatively, with probability
1   e 2=q1 ; V* does have a second applicant on its short list. Both V and
V* are willing to bid the wage up to s: V then gets A with probability 12
and realizes prot 1  s: With probability 12 ; V fails to get A and proceeds
to its second-round choice (again, call him B). As before, B is still available
in the second round with probability 1  q1; given that he is still available,
B receives no competing second round o¤er with probability 1   q2; and V
gets prot 1  w:
Summarizing, a vacancy has two applicants on its short list with proba-
bility 1  e 2=   2e 2=: In this case, the vacancys expected prot is
(1  q1)(1  w) + q1(1  s):
We can now compute the expected prot for a vacancy that posts the
same wage w as all other vacancies:
(w) =

1  e 2=

[(1  q1)(1  w) + q1(1  s)]  2e 4=(1  s) (26)
C.3 Derivation of the Equilibrium Wage
C.3.1 Deviations
Suppose all vacancies, save possibly one, post w: Suppose a deviant (D)
posts w0: A deviation to w0 changes the worker application intensity to D
from 2= to : The indi¤erence condition giving  = (w0;w) is given below.
Consider the deviant posting w0 and receiving applications at rate :
D receives exactly one application with probability e : With probability
1   q1; Ds applicant (again, call her A) does not have a competing rst-
round o¤er. In this case, Ds prot is 1   w0: With probability q1; A has a
competing rst-round o¤er. With probability e
 2=
q1
; the competing vacancy
(V*) has no second-round candidate, and Bertrand competition drives prot
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to zero. With probability 1  e 2=q1 ; V* has a second-round candidate, and
D realizes prot 1  s: Summarizing, D receives expected prot
(1  q1)(1  w0) + (q1   e 2=)(1  s)
with probability e :
D receives 2 or more applications with probability 1   e    e : Ds
rst-round choice fails to get a competing rst-round o¤er with probability
1   q1; in which case Ds prot is again 1   w0: With probability q1; A has
another rst-round o¤er. V* has no second-round candidate with probability
e 2=
q1
; and D is thus outbid and proceeds to the second round. Ds second-
round choice (B) is still available with probability 1   q1: Given that B
is still available, he does not receive a competing second-round o¤er with
probability 1  q2, and D gets prot 1 w0: If B does receive a second-round
o¤er, Bertrand competition drives prot to zero.
Now suppose V* has a second-round choice. This occurs with probability
1   e 2=q1 : In this case, D wins the race for A (s0 > s) if w0 > w: Ds prot
is then 1   s: If w0 < w; D loses the race and turns to its second-round
candidate (B). B is still available with probability 1   q1; given that he is
still available, he receives no competing second-round o¤er with probability
1  q2; and D gets prot 1  w0:
Note that with 2 or more applicants, Ds expected prot (as a function of
w0) depends on whether w0 is greater or less than w: Specically, if w0 > w;
D receives expected prot
(1  q1)(1  w0) + e 2=(1  s0) + (q1   e 2=)(1  s);
while if w0 < w; D receives expected prot
(1  q1)(1  w0) + q1(1  s0):
Summarizing, if w0 > w;
+(w0;w) =

1  e 

[(1 q1)(1 w0)+(q1 e 2=)(1 s)]+

1  e    e 

e 2=(1 s0):
If w0 < w;
 (w0;w) =

1  e 

(1 q1)(1 w0)+e (q1 e 2=)(1 s)+

1  e    e 

q1(1 s0):
To derive  = (w0;w); we now turn to the indi¤erence condition.
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C.3.2 Indi¤erence Condition
An applicant (A) should be indi¤erent between sending both applications
to nondeviant (N) vacancies versus sending one application to N and the
other to D when the arrival intensity is 2= at any N vacancy and  at D.
Consider an application to an N vacancy. A is rst on Ns short list with
probability q1: She is second on Ns short list with probability q1   e 2=:
(A is not rst on Ns short list with probability 1   q1: Conditional on not
being rst, she is second with probability q1 e
 2=
1 q1 :) Finally, she is out of the
running at N with probability 1  2q1 + e 2=: Similarly, if A applies to D,
she is rst on Ds short list with probability qD1 =
1
 (1  e ); she is second
on Ds short list with probability qD1   e ; and she is out of the running at
D with probability 1  2qD1 + e :
Suppose A sends one application to D and one to N. There are 9 possi-
bilities to consider.
1. A is rst on both short lists. This occurs with probability qD1 q1: If
neither D nor N has a second candidate, As payo¤ is 1: Given that A
is rst on both short lists, this occurs with probability e
 e 2=
qD1 q1
: If D
has a second candidate but N does not, As payo¤ is s0: This occurs
with probability (q
D
1  e )e 2=
qD1 q1
: If N has a second candidate, but D does
not, As payo¤ is s: This occurs with probability e
 (q1 e 2=)
qD1 q1
: If both
vacancies have second candidates, As payo¤ is s if w0 > w and s0 if
w > w0: The probability that both D and N have second candidates is
(qD1  e )(q1 e 2=)
qD1 q1
:
2. A is rst on Ds short list and second on Ns. This occurs with prob-
ability qD1 (q1   e 2=); and As payo¤ is w0:12
3. A is rst on Ds short list and out of the running at N. This occurs
with probability qD1 (1  2q1 + e 2=); and As payo¤ is again w0:
4. A is second on Ds short list and rst on Ns. This occurs with prob-
ability (qD1   e )q1; and As payo¤ is w:
5. A is second on both short lists. This occurs with probability (qD1  
e )(q1   e 2=):
12We evaluate the derivative of (w0;w) at w0 = w; so we need not consider the case in
which w0 is considerably less thanw: Were that the case, A might prefer to reject w0 in
hopes of getting a second round o¤er from N.
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a. w0 > w: The probability that A gets a second-round o¤er from D is
e 2=: This follows because D hires its rst-round candidate if that per-
son has no other o¤er (probability 1 q1) or if that person has another
o¤er and the competing vacancy has a second applicant (probability
q1  e 2=): Thus D fails to hire its rst-round candidate and makes a
second-round o¤er to A with probability 1 (1 q1+q1 e 2=) = e 2=:
The probability that A gets a second-round o¤er from N is q1+e
 2=
2 :
N hires its rst-round candidate if that person does not have another
rst-round o¤er (probability 1   q1) or if that person has another
o¤er, the other vacancy has a second- round candidate, and the ap-
plicant chooses N (probability
1
2
 (q1   e 2=)): There are now 4
possibilities. First, A receives a second-round o¤er neither from D
nor from N. In this case, As payo¤ is zero. Second, A receives a
second-round o¤er from D but not from N. This occurs with proba-
bility e 2=(1  q1+e 2=2 ); and A receives payo¤ w0. Third, A receives
a second-round o¤er from N but not from D. This occurs with proba-
bility q1+e
 2=
2 (1  e 2=); and A receives payo¤ w: Finally, A receives
second-round o¤ers from both D and N. This occurs with probabil-
ity e
 2=(q1+e 2=)
2 ; and A receives payo¤ 1. Thus, when w
0 > w; As
expected payo¤ in the event that she is second on both short lists is
e 2=(1  q1+e 2=2 )w0 + q1+e
 2=
2 (1  e 2=)w + e
 2=(q1+e 2=)
2 :
b. w0 < w: In this case, the probability that D makes a second-round
o¤er is q1 since the only way that D can succeed in the rst round is
if its candidate does not have another o¤er (probability 1   q1). The
probability that A gets a second-round o¤er from N is again q1+e
 2=
2 :
With probability q1(1   q1+e 2=2 ); A gets a second-round o¤er from
D but not from N. In this case, As payo¤ is w0: With probability
(1   q1) q1+e 2=2 ; D hires in the rst round, but N does not. In this
case, As payo¤ is w: Finally, with probability q1(q1+e
 2=)
2 ; both D and
N make second-round o¤ers to A and As payo¤ is 1: Summarizing, if
w0 < w; As expected payo¤ is q1(1  q1+e 2=2 )w0+(1 q1) q1+e
 2=
2 w+
q1(q1+e 2=)
2 :
6. A is second on Ds short list and out of the running at N. This occurs
with probability (qD1   e )(1   2q1 + e 2=): If w0 > w; D hires in
the rst round with probability 1  e 2= and As payo¤ is zero. With
probability e 2=; As payo¤ is w0: If w0 < w; D fails to hire in the rst
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round with probability q1: In this case, As payo¤ is w0:
7. A is out of the running at D and rst on Ns short list. This occurs
with probability (1  2qD1 + e )q1: In this case, As payo¤ is w:
8. A is out of the running at D and second on Ns short list. This occurs
with probability (1   2qD1 + e )(q1   e 2=): N hires its rst-round
candidate with probability 1  (q1+e 2=)2 and As payo¤ is zero. Alter-
natively, N fails to hire on the rst round with probability (q1+e
 2=)
2 ;
in which case As payo¤ is w:
9. Finally, A is out of the running at both D and N. This occurs with
probability (1 2qD1 +e )(1 2q1+e 2=); and in this case, As payo¤
is zero.
The discussion above is summarized in the following table, which presents
the expected payo¤ for a worker who sends one application to D and one to
N for each of the nine possible outcomes associated with that application
strategy.
D N Probability Expected Payo¤ (w0 > w)
1 1 qD1 q1
e e 2=
qD1 q1
+
(qD1  e )e 2=
qD1 q1
s0+ q
D
1 (q1 e 2=)
qD1 q1
s
1 2 qD1 (q1 e 2=) w0
1 x qD1 (1  2q1+e 2=) w0
2 1 (qD1  e )q1 w
2 2 (qD1  e )(q1 e 2=) e
 2=(2 q1 e 2=)w0
2 +
(q1+e 2=)(1 e 2=)w
2 +
e 2=(q1+e 2=)
2
2 x (qD1  e )(1  2q1+e 2=) w0e 2=
x 1 (1  2qD1 +e )q1 w
x 2 (1  2qD1 +e )(q1 e 2=) (q1+e
 2=)
2 w
x x (1  2qD1 +e )(1  2q1+e 2=) 0
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D N Probability Expected Payo¤ (w0 < w)
1 1 qD1 q1
e e 2=
qD1 q1
+
(qD1  e )q1
qD1 q1
s0+ e
 (q1 e 2=)
qD1 q1
s
1 2 qD1 (q1 e 2=) w0
1 x qD1 (1  2q1+e 2=) w0
2 1 (qD1  e )q1 w
2 2 (qD1  e )(q1 e 2=) q1(1  q1+e
 2=
2 )w
0+(1  q1) q1+e
 2=
2 w+
q1(q1+e 2=)
2
2 x (qD1  e )(1  2q1+e 2=) q1w0
x 1 (1  2qD1 +e )q1 w
x 2 (1  2qD1 +e )(q1 e 2=) (q1+e
 2=)
2 w
x x (1  2qD1 +e )(1  2q1+e 2=) 0
We can now compute the value of sending one application to D and one
to N, i.e., a (D,N) strategy, for any w0; w pair. The table indicates that the
form of this value di¤ers according to whether w0 > w or vice versa.
Indi¤erence between sending one application to D and one to N versus
sending both applications to N vacancies denes (w0; w): We want to nd
how the application intensity to D varies with small deviations from w;
rst for the case in which the deviants wage is above the wage o¤ered by
the N vacancies and then for the case of w0 < w: That is, we want to
nd @
+(w0;w)
@w0 jw0=w and @
 (w0;w)
@w0 jw0=w; the right-hand and left-hand side
derivatives of the application intensity, evaluated at w0 = w:
We begin with @
+(w0;w)
@w0 jw0=w: The expected payo¤ from a (D,N) strategy
when w0 > w is found using the gures in the top panel of the table and can
be written as:
e e 2= + (qD1   e )e 2=s0 + qD1 (q1   e 2=)s+ (qD1   e )(1  q1)e 2=q2
+w0fqD1 (1  q1)(1 + e 2=(1  q2))  e e 2=(1  q1)(1  q2)g
+wfq1(1  qD1 ) + (1  qD1   e 2=(qD1   e ))(1  q1)q2g
The application intensity  is found by equating the individuals expected
payo¤ from a (D,N) strategy to the expected payo¤ from applying to two
N vacancies. We nd @
+(w0;w)
@w0 by taking the derivatives of both sides with
respect to w0: Since the expected payo¤ from applying to two N vacancies
does not depend on w0; this entails equating the derivative of the expected
payo¤ from a (D,N) strategy with respect to w0 to zero and solving for
@+(w0;w)
@w0 .
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This gives: @
+(w0;w)
@w0 jw0=w =
(1 q1)[q1+2e 2=(1 q2)(q1 e 2=)]
e 4=(1 q1)[(1 2q2) w(2 3q2)] 
@qD1
@ [q1(q2+q1(1 q2))+(1 q1)q2e 2=+w((1 q1)e 2= q1+(1 q21)(1 q2))]
Next, we nd @
 (w0;w)
@w0 jw0=w: The procedure is the same, but we must take
into account the di¤erences in the expected payo¤ a (D,N) strategy when
w > w0: The expected payo¤ is now found using the gures in the bottom
panel of the table and can be written as:
e e 2= + e (q1   e 2=)s+ q1(qD1   e )s0 + q1(qD1   e )(1  q1)q2]
+w0(1  q1)[qD1 + q1(qD1   e )(1  q2)]
+w[q1(1  qD1 ) + q2(1  q1)(1  qD1   q1(qD1   e ))]:
Setting the derivative of this with respect to w0 equal to zero allows us to
nd
@ (w0;w)
@w0 jw0=w =
(1 q1)q1(1+2(q1 e 2=)(1 q2))
e 2=(1 q1)(e 2= q2(q1+e 2=) w((q1+e 2=)(1 q2) q1q2)) 
@qD1
@ (q
2
1+2q1q2(1 q1)+w((3q1 2)q1q2 2q21+1 q2))
C.3.3 Equilibrium with Shortlisting
We seek a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium posted wage. That is,
we seek a posted wage w with the property that if all other vacancies post
w; an individual vacancy neither has an incentive to post a higher wage nor
a lower wage. If all vacancies post w; then there will be three wages paid in
equilibrium, namely, w; s; and 1:
Recall that for w0 > w;
+(w0;w) =

1  e 

[(1 q1)(1 w0)+(q1 e 2=)(1 s)]+

1  e    e 

e 2=(1 s0):
The right-hand side derivative of prot is
@+(w0;w)
@w0 =

e 

(1  q1)(1  w0) + (q1   e 2=)(1  s)

+ e e 2=(1  s0)

@+(w0;w)
@w0
 

1  e 

(1  q1) 

1  e    e 

e 2=(1  q1)(1  q2):
Evaluating at w0 = w gives
@+(w0;w)
@w0 =

e 2=

(1  q1)(1  w) + (q1   e 2=)(1  s)

+ 2e
 4=(1  s)

@+(w;w)
@w0
 

1  e 2=

(1  q1) 

1  e 2=   2e 2=

e 2=(1  q1)(1  q2):
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We nd the left-hand side derivative in a similar fashion. For w0 < w;
 (w0;w) =

1  e 

(1 q1)(1 w0)+e (q1 e 2=)(1 s)+

1  e    e 

q1(1 s0);
so
@ (w0;w)
@w0 =

e 
 
(1  q1)(1  w0) + q1(1  s) + (q1   e 2=)(1  s)  q1(1  s0)

 e   (q1   e 2=)(1  s)  q1(1  s0)

@ (w0;w)
@w0
 

1  e 

((1  q1) + q1(1  q1)(1  q2)) + e q1(1  q1)(1  q2):
Evaluating at w0 = w gives
@ (w;w)
@w0 =

e 2=

(1  q1)(1  w) + (q1   e 2=)(1  s)

+ 2e
 4=(1  s)

@ (w;w)
@w0
 (1  e 2=)(1  q1)  q1(1  e 2=   2e 2=)(1  q1)(1  q2):
Given ; a posted wage w is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if @
+(w0;w)
@w0 jw0=w 
0 and @
 (w0;w)
@w0 jw0=w  0:
We investigate the nature of equilibrium numerically. For  below ap-
proximately 0:42; both derivatives are negative for all w 2 [0; 1]: Thus, for
these values of ; the unique pure-strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium is
w = 0: For  above this cuto¤ level, there exists a range of w such that
both inequalities are satised. The range of equilibrium posted wages goes
from about 0:01 to about 0:04 when  = 0:5: When  = 2; there is again a
range of equilibrium posted wages, this time from about w = 0:36 to about
w = 0:71: We have repeated this exercise for many values of ; and the re-
sult is always qualitatively the same. The left-hand side derivative of prot
with respect to the deviant wage, evaluated at the common wage, is always
greater than the corresponding right-hand side derivative. Both derivatives
are positive at w = 0 and both are negative (and equal to each other) at
w = 1: Thus, given  above the cuto¤ level, there is a continuum of equilib-
ria, ranging from the wage at which @
+(w0;w)
@w0 jw0=w = 0 to the one at which
@ (w0;w)
@w0 jw0=w = 0:
C.4 E¢ ciency
The nal step is to investigate the relationship between the equilibrium and
e¢ cient levels of : We show numerically that there is excessive vacancy
creation in equilibrium; that is,  > :
As in Section 3,  is dened by cv = m(); where the derivative m()
is now computed using equation (22) and the denitions of q1 and q2; which
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Figure 1: (w()) (upper curve) and m() (lower curve)
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are given in equations (23) and (24). The equilibrium value,  is dened
by the free-entry condition, cv = (w()), where w() is an equilibrium
wage given : As noted above, for  below the cuto¤ level, w() = 0: For 
above the cuto¤ level, we focus on w (); that is, the wage that, given ;
solves @
 (w0;w)
@w0 jw0=w = 0: Given ; this is the highest possible equilibrium
wage.
In Figure 1, we plot m() and (w ()) against : As in Section 3,
(w ()) > m() for each value of : Equivalently,  > :
D O¤er-Beating strategies
Proof of Proposition 5: Expected prot in a symmetric o¤er-beating
equilibrium in which all vacancies post w is
(w) = (1  w)(1  e a=)(1  (1  q)
a
aq
); where q =

a
(1  e a=):
The rst term in (w) is prot for a vacancy that hires a worker at w; the
second term is the probability the vacancy receives at least one application,
and the third term is the probability that the vacancy hires conditional
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on receiving at least one application. The derivation of the third term is
as follows. Consider an applicant selected by a particular vacancy. The
number of other o¤ers this applicant has is bin(a   1; q): Given that all
vacancies follow the o¤er-beating strategy, i.e., do not engage in Bertrand
competition, the probability that the vacancy in question succeeds in hiring
the applicant is then
a 1X
x=0
1
x+ 1

a  1
x

qx(1  q)a 1 x = 1  (1  q)
a
aq
:
We rst consider the expected prot associated with an upward devia-
tion, i.e., a posted wage of w0 > w:We bound this expected prot, which we
call +(w0;w), by noting that an upward deviation can increase the hiring
probability to at most 1 and that prot conditional on hiring the worker,
1 w0; is less than 1 w: The deviant makes a prot on its applicant only if
all the other applications that the applicant makes are rejected. This occurs
with probability (1   q)a 1: If the applicant has one or more other o¤ers,
the o¤er-beating strategy followed by the other vacancies calls for Bertrand
competition since w0 > w: We thus have
+(w0;w) < (1  w)  1  (1  q)a 1:
The fact that no vacancy wants to make an upward deviation then follows
from
(1  q)a 1 < (1  e a=)(1  (1  q)
a
aq
) =
1  (1  q)a

;
which holds for a  2:
To verify this, rewrite the inequality as
y(a; q) =
1  (1  q)a

  (1  q)a 1 > 0:
Let x =
a

; so q(x) =
1  e x
x
; and dene z(x; a) = ay(a; q) or
z(x; a) = x(1  (1  q)a)  a(1  q)a 1:
We want to show that z(x; a) > 0 for all x > 0 and a  2: This is done by
induction. First,
z(x; 2) =
1  e 2x   2xe 2x
x
:
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Using LHôpitals Rule, z(0; 2) = 0: Since the numerator of z(x; 2) is positive
for all x > 0, it follows that z(x; 2) > 0:
Now suppose z(x; b) > 0 for some integer b > 0: We have
z(x; b+ 1) = x(1  (1  q)b+1)  (b+ 1)(1  q)b
=

x(1  (1  q)b)  b(1  q)b 1

(1  q) + xq   (1  q)b
= z(x; b)(1  q) + xq   (1  q)b:
Thus,
z(x; b+ 1) > xq   (1  q)b = 1  e x   (1  q)b
> 1  e x   (1  q) = q   e x = 1  e
 x   xe x
x
:
It is straightforward to show (mimicking the argument that z(x; 2) > 0 for
all x > 0) that this nal term is positive for all x > 0: Thus, z(x; b) > 0 =>
z(x; b+ 1) > 0; and our proof by induction is complete.
Next, we consider the expected prot associated with a downward de-
viation, i.e., a posted wage of w0 < w: To develop an expression for this
expectation,  (w0;w); we mimic the argument given in the proof of Propo-
sition 2. Specically, suppose workers apply to the deviant (D) with Poisson
intensity ; where  is determined by an indi¤erence condition to be given
below. Then
 (w0;w) = (1  w0)(1  e )(1  q)a 1:
The second term is the probability that D gets at least one application, and
the third term is the probability that Ds chosen applicant has no other
o¤ers. Note that the nal term is independent of w0:
The condition determining  is that each worker be indi¤erent between
sending all a applications to nondeviants (N) versus a 1 applications to N
and one application to D: The expected payo¤ to the rst strategy depends
on neither w0 nor . The expected payo¤ to the second strategy is
qD(1  q)a 1w0 + (1  (1  q)a 1)w;
where
qD =
1  e 

is the probability that a workers application to D is accepted. The rst
term in this expected payo¤ is the probability that the worker gets the o¤er
from D but no o¤ers from N ; in this case, the payo¤ is w0: The second term
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is the probability of at least one o¤er from N ; in this case the expected
payo¤ is w: Equating these two expected payo¤s denes  as a function of
w0: Using
dqD
d
=
   1  e    e 
2
;
it is straightforward to derive
d
dw0
=
(1  e )
w0 (1  e    e ) :
Finally,
d (w0;w)
dw0
=

 (1  e ) + (1  w0)e  d
dw0

(1  q)a 1:
This derivative is nonnegative, i.e., D has no incentive to post w0 < w; so
long as
w0

1  e    e 

 (1  w0)e ; i.e.,
w0  e
 
1  e  :
Evaluating at w0 = w; D has no incentive to undercut the common wage w
so long as w  a

e a=
1  e a= : QED.
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